Can U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule with a two percent inflation target when policy is evaluated with real-time inflation and output gap data? If so, it is problematic to use the Taylor rule as a guide to good policy as the Federal Reserve implements its exit strategy from the extraordinary measures taken in 2008 and 2009 since the same policy produced the Great Inflation. Using economic research on the full employment level of unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment published between 1970 and 1977 to construct real-time output gap measures for the periods of peak unemployment, we find that the Federal Reserve did not follow a Taylor rule if appropriate measures are used. We estimate Taylor rules and find no evidence that monetary policy stabilized inflation, even allowing for changes in the inflation target. While monetary policy was stabilizing with respect to inflation forecasts, the forecasts systematically under-predicted inflation following the 1970s recessions and this does not constitute evidence of stabilizing policy. We also find that the Federal Reserve responded too strongly to negative output gaps. If the Federal Reserve stabilizes inflation and does not respond too strongly to the output gap as the recovery begins, the 2010s can be a period of good economic performance like the 1980s and 1990s rather than a repeat of the 1970s.
Introduction
Can U.S. monetary policy in the 1970s be described by a stabilizing Taylor rule, where the Federal Reserve increased the interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation? Or is it better described as a series of stop-start policies, where repeated abortive attempts to fight inflation overstimulated the economy and ultimately produced what is now called the Great Inflation? The answers to these questions have both historical and current policy implications. From a historical perspective, it is important to understand the economic policies that produced the worst decade of economic performance since the 1930s. From a current policy perspective, it is important to consider how the experience of the 1970s relates to policy questions of the 2010s.
Federal Reserve policy from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s can be analyzed in the context of a variant of the Taylor rule, where the real interest rate is increased when inflation and/or the output gap rises. While the focus of policy shifted from interest rate setting to balance sheet effects in 2008, culminating in the target for the federal funds rate of between 0 and ¼ percent in December, the change in focus is clearly not intended to be permanent. Both Chairman Bernanke (2009) and Vice-Chairman Kohn (2009a) have discussed how, once the recovery starts and inflation becomes a threat, the Federal Reserve will need to drain some of the excess liquidity it has put in the system and start to raise interest rates. As long as the nominal interest rate is raised more than point-for-point with inflation, so that the real interest rate rises, the Taylor principle will be satisfied as the Federal Reserve moves from crisis-based policy to more normal interest-rate-setting policy. Meltzer (2009a) has raised the specter that policymaking in the 2010s could cause a repeat of the 1970s. He characterizes Federal Reserve policy in the 1970s as combating a recession by promoting expansion, printing money to make borrowing easier, and worrying only later about the resultant inflation, producing a decade of slow productivity growth, rising unemployment, and rising inflation. If inflation in the next few years starts to rise with high unemployment and a slow recovery, there will be pressure on the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates low. His fear is that, if the Federal Reserve succumbs to this pressure, it will cause inflation to rise which, as we know from the disinflation of the early 1980s, is very costly to bring down. 1 Plosser (2009) focuses on the difficulty in measuring output gaps. For the 1970s, he argues that the output gaps during the recession of the mid-1970s turned out to be much smaller than perceived at the time. The high perceived output gaps led many economists and Federal Reserve policymakers to believe that inflation would be kept in check which, in turn, led to rapid monetary expansion and rising inflation.
Combined with the Federal Reserve's lack of a credible commitment to maintain price stability, the result revised output gap data is much smaller than the real-time data known to Federal Reserve officials at the time that policy decisions were made. Using real-time data produced by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), he shows that Federal Reserve policy in the 1970s is consistent with a stabilizing Taylor rule with a 2 percent inflation target. He also argues that, had the Federal Reserve followed the Taylor rule exactly, the resultant interest rates would have been even lower, further stimulating the economy and producing more inflation. 2 While Orphanides' argument for the use of real-time data has become virtually universally accepted for Taylor rule estimation, his use of CEA output gaps for this period is controversial. Taylor (2000) argued that these estimates of potential GDP and its growth rate were politicized starting in the late 1960s and that serious economic analysts, such as Arthur Burns, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve from February 1970 to January 1978, and Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the CEA from September 1974 to January 1977, paid no attention to the CEA estimates. 3 Cecchetti et al (2007) propose an alternative real-time output gap measure, the percentage deviation of GDP from its trend, computed by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, using only data available at the time. Their HP filtered output gaps are smaller than Orphanides' output gaps throughout the 1970s, especially during the recession of 1974-1975, and are close to current Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates with revised data. Levin and Taylor (2009) use the same measure.
Is the question of whether the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule in the 1970s simply a matter of whether revised or real-time data is used? The answer is no. Using Orphanides' methods, we calculate the federal funds rate implied by a stabilizing Taylor rule with a 2 percent inflation target, but using real-time HP filtered output gaps. The implied policy rate is closer to the rate calculated using revised CBO data than real-time CEA data. It is consistently higher than the actual rate, supporting the conventional view that Federal Reserve policy was too stimulative during this period and, therefore, contributed to the Great Inflation. Monetary policy analysis for the 1970s does not just depend on the use of real-time versus revised data; it depends crucially on what real-time data is used.
Since HP filtering was not invented until 1981, HP detrending does not seem to be the most obvious choice to construct real-time output gaps for the 1970s. Cecchetti et al (2007) justify their choice on the basis that, while the technology for calculating HP trends was not available at the time, the ability to calculate more rudimentary trends was. The leading method for calculating output gaps in the 1970s was linear detrending, followed by quadratic detrending. estimate with revised data. The difference comes from two factors: the productivity growth slowdown and changes in the composition of the labor force. While the former was not recognized at the time, the latter clearly was, producing real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment between the official CEA and revised CBO estimates.
We use real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment to evaluate the four real-time output gap measures. Focusing on 1975:2, the quarter of peak unemployment, we show that the real-time
Okun's law output gap approximation is smaller than the CEA estimated output gap, but larger than the HP detrended output gap. The output gaps constructed using real-time linear and quadratic detrending are much closer to the real-time Okun's law approximation than either the CEA or the HP filtered measures.
The same picture emerges from considering 1971:4, the quarter of peak unemployment following the recession of 1969-1970, although the evidence for the real-time measure of the natural rate of unemployment is not as comprehensive. Since linear detrended output gaps use the leading detrending method for the 1970s and are close to the real-time Okun's Law approximation, they are the best real-time output gap measure that we are able to construct.
As an additional metric, we use the estimates of the natural rate of unemployment reported in Gordon's (1978) textbook, using the methodology from Gordon (1977) . While not real-time measures, they closely approximate real-time estimates when the latter are available. Using an Okun's Law coefficient of -3.0, the resultant output gaps are much closer to output gaps constructed using real-time linear and quadratic data than to either the CEA estimated output gap or the real-time HP detrended output gap. Consequently, the policy rates implied by the "Gordon" output gaps are consistently higher than the actual rates, confirming the evidence that Federal Reserve policy was too stimulative.
We proceed to estimate Taylor rules for the late 1960s and 1970s, using real-time inflation and   four real-time measures of the output gap: linear detrended, quadratic detrended, HP detrended, and CEA, as well as within-quarter CEA output gap forecasts. 4 With linear detrended output gaps, the coefficient on the four-quarter average inflation rate is below one, so that monetary policy did not follow a stabilizing Reserve followed a Taylor rule with inflation rates and, with the exception of one and two-quarter-ahead forecasts using CEA-forecast gaps, no evidence of a stabilizing rule with inflation forecasts.
The second aspect of the Taylor rule involves the response of the interest rate to the output gap.
With linear and quadratic detrended output gaps, the estimated coefficients are approximately 0.70 and 1.0, respectively, both higher than Taylor's postulated coefficient of 0.5. The response to the output gap, especially during times of peak unemployment, contributed to making monetary policy too stimulative in the 1970s. With an output gap of -10 percent, which we will argue below is a reasonable approximation for real-time output gaps in 1975, going from a Taylor rule with a 0.5 coefficient to rules with 0.7 and 1.0 coefficients lowers the federal funds rate target by 2 and 5 percentage points, respectively. Chairman, and in 1976:1, when President Carter took office. Changes in the inflation target can only be measured if there is a well-specified target which, in turn, requires that the inflation or inflation forecast coefficient be significantly greater than one. The inflation coefficient is not significantly different from one with four-quarter average real-time inflation rates for any of the five real-time output gap measures.
With one to four-quarter inflation forecasts, the inflation coefficient is significantly different from one in most cases and, for all specifications for which there is a well-defined inflation target, the target increased 
Taylor Rules with Real-Time Data for the 1970s
Following Taylor (1993) , the monetary policy rule postulated to be followed by central banks can be specified as Reserve had followed a Taylor rule with the coefficients as in Equation (2) Since the data are published with a one-quarter lag, real-time inflation for quarter t is defined as the log change ending in quarter t -1 and the real-time output gap for 6 Taylor (2009b) assumes that inflation is 2.0 percent, which raises the implied interest rate to 2.0 percent. 7 When Taylor rules are estimated, rather than used for policy evaluation, it is standard practice to allow for partial adjustment of the interest rate to its target. We incorporate partial adjustment in the context of estimation below. quarter t as the log difference between real and potential output in quarter t -1, in percent. 8 It is immediately apparent from Figure 1 that the difference between revised and real-time data is much larger for the output gap than for inflation, with by far the largest difference at the trough of the recession in 1975. 9 The implications for using Orphanides' real-time output gap measure, rather than a revised output gap measure, are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . The federal funds rate implied by the Taylor rule in (2), with Taylor's original coefficients, is depicted using revised and real-time data, along with the actual federal funds rate. This figure summarizes Orphanides' argument. With revised data, the actual federal funds rate is consistently below the implied rate, indicating that policy was too stimulative and caused (or at least contributed to) the Great Inflation. With real-time data, the actual federal funds rate is very close to the implied rate for considerable periods of time. In fact, the federal funds rate Since the GDP data was available with a one-quarter lag, the observation for 1969:1 incorporates data through 1968:4. With each new observation, another data point is added to the trend. The last point in the sample is 1979:2, which uses data through 1979:1. In Figure 2 (top panel), we depict the HP filtered realtime output gap along with the revised CBO estimates and real-time CEA estimates described earlier.
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8 Orphanides (2000) provides more information about how the data were constructed. Orphanides (2003b Orphanides ( , 2004 uses CEA real-time output gap data based on within-quarter forecasts, which differs slightly from the data used in these papers (and from each other). We use the one-quarter-lagged data for comparability with other methods for constructing real-time output gaps. 9 While our revised data can differ from Orphanides' because we use April 2009 and he uses October 1999 CBO numbers, the differences are miniscule. 10 Levin and Taylor (1999) present the same figure, except that they use output gap data from Orphanides (2003b) .
The HP filtered real-time output gaps are much smaller than the real-time CEA estimates throughout the 1970s, and track the revised CBO estimates fairly closely. detrending, as used by Taylor (1980) , followed by quadratic detrending. 12 In order to see how HP filtering compares with these methods, we estimate real-time linear and quadratic detrended output gaps using the same data as for the HP detrended output gaps described above. quadratic detrended output gaps is lower than the implied rate with real-time HP detrended data, the conclusion that monetary policy was too stimulative and contributed to the Great Inflation is the same.
Real-Time Output Gaps for the 1970s
Using different measures of real-time output gaps, we have shown that you can reach completely different conclusions regarding whether or not the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule during the 1970s. With CEA output gaps, the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor rule but failed to prevent the Great Inflation. With real-time HP filtered output gaps, the federal funds rate implied by a Taylor rule was about the same as with revised CBO data, and monetary policy was clearly too stimulative. With real-time linear and quadratic detrended output gaps, the implied federal funds rate was lower than with revised CBO data, but policy was still too stimulative.
Real-Time Okun's Law Output Gaps
Which output gap measure best approximates the perceptions of policymakers in the 1970s?
While one cannot hope for a definitive answer, we propose the following metric. One of the best-known rules of economics is Okun's Law, which states that the output gap equals a (negative) coefficient times the difference between current unemployment and either the unemployment rate at full employment or the natural rate of unemployment. Using academic research available to policymakers and writing of policymakers themselves, we use Okun's Law to construct "rule-of-thumb" output gaps based on real- Estimating real-time natural rates of unemployment for the 1970s is not as straightforward. Two interacting factors complicate the analysis. First, between the late-1960s and the mid-1970s, the natural rate (or accelerationist) hypothesis of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) went from an original proposal to a generally accepted theory. Second, between the early 1970s and the mid 1970s, the structural shift hypothesis of Perry (1970) that demographic changes had raised the unemployment rate at full employment and/or the natural rate of unemployment became both generally accepted and refined.
The official value of the full employment unemployment rate was set at 4.0 percent in the 1962
Economic Report of the President. This value was based on evidence that actual GNP in mid-1955, when the unemployment rate was close to 4.0 percent, was equal to potential output. 13 While the official value remained unchanged until the 1977 Report, when it was raised to 4.9 percent with a natural rate interpretation, the 4.0 percent number is a misleading representation of real-time beliefs in the 1970s for two reasons. First, as emphasized by Taylor (2000) , the text of the 1977 Report makes it clear that the CEA staff did not believe the 4.9 percent number. After describing how the CEA "has estimated that the full-employment unemployment rate equivalent to 4.0 percent in 1955 is now 4.9 percent," the text almost immediately goes on say that there are other factors that were not considered and that "it is likely that they have raised the full-employment unemployment rate even higher than the current estimate, perhaps closer to 5 ½ percent." Later in the same chapter, it is suggested that policy makers "should watch closely for signs of accelerating wage inflation when the overall rate of unemployment falls to about 5 ½ percent." 14 Second, and more relevant for the purpose of this paper, is that starting in the late 1960s and continuing through the mid-1970s, a considerable amount of high-profile research showed that 4.0 percent was not a realistic number for either the full-employment unemployment rate or the natural rate of unemployment.
The complications involved in estimating real-time natural rates of unemployment can be illustrated by using the most straightforward method to estimate the natural rate, calculating the average of past unemployment rates. 15 Hall (1999) discusses the advantages of this approach.
Research on the Natural Rate of Unemployment in the 1970s
A very early estimate of the natural rate of unemployment was contained in the report of the PrePresidential Task Force on Inflation (1969), written in late 1968 and forwarded to President-Elect Nixon by Arthur Burns, who was in charge of all 17 task force reports, on January 18, 1969. The task force, which included Edmund Phelps as a member, wrote that they believed the normal level of unemployment was in the 4 -5 percent range. The report used the term "normal level of unemployment" in exactly the same way that "natural rate of unemployment" would be used today, as the unemployment rate below which inflation would accelerate. 
Estimated Taylor Rules for the 1970s
For the purpose of estimation, it has become common practice to specify a variant of the Taylor rule which allows for the possibility that the interest rate adjusts gradually to achieve its target level.
Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we assume that the actual observable interest rate i t partially adjusts to the target as follows:
Substituting (2) into (3) gives the following equation,
Equation (4) can be estimated by nonlinear least squares. Table 1 depicts estimates of Equation (4) , it seems reasonable to assume that, during this period, the equilibrium real interest rate was more stable than the inflation target. An implied inflation target can be identified from estimates of  and the inflation coefficient
Estimated Taylor Rules
by assuming a value of 2.0 percent for the equilibrium real interest rate. This procedure, however, is only valid if the estimate of the inflation coefficient  in Equation (4) is significantly greater than one, which requires that the estimate of  in Equation (1) be significantly greater than zero. The results that the estimates of  with linear and 22 We do not estimate models using either the CBO or the "Gordon" output gaps because they are not real-time measures that could have been used by policymakers. Estimates with the CEA and HP detrended output gaps are also presented in Table 1 Table 1 also reports estimates of Equation (4) In contrast with our actual real-time inflation rates, which are annualized four quarter averages, the one-quarter forecast is simply the annualized quarterly rate.
Estimated Taylor rules with one-quarter inflation forecasts are reported in Table 1 Estimation results for two, three, and four quarter inflation forecasts are reported in Table 2 , for which the inflation data is consecutively available starting in 1968:4, 1973:3, and 1974:2, respectively. Figure 6 depicts the actual inflation rates and the one-to-four quarter inflation forecasts. 24 The two and three quarter forecasts are annualized two and three quarter averages. With the linear output gaps, the inflation coefficients are 1.61 (two-quarter forecast), 1.63 (three-quarter forecast), and 1.55 (four-quarter forecast), with the two and three-quarter inflation forecast coefficients significantly different from unity.
The implied inflation targets are 3.70 (two-quarter forecast) and 3.33 (three-quarter forecast). The inflation forecast coefficients for the quadratic, CEA, and CEA-forecast output gaps are stabilizing, but are not significantly different from one. 25 The coefficients for the HP gaps are either not stabilizing (twoquarter) or unreasonably large (three and four-quarter), and are never significantly different from one.
The results with inflation forecasts are different than with inflation rates in several respects. For the linear output gaps, the inflation coefficients are stabilizing and mostly significantly different from unity. For the quadratic, CEA, and CEA-forecast output gaps, the inflation coefficients are also 23 There are minor differences because Orphanides (2004) included two lags of the interest rate. Orphanides (2001) produced very similar results with one lag. 24 As illustrated in Figure 6 and described in the notes to Table 2 , there are varying numbers on non-consecutive observations and, in one case, a missing observation. We follow Orphanides (2004) and use all available data for the estimation. 25 The only exception is the two-quarter inflation forecast with CEA-forecast output gaps. In that case, the constant is greater than 2.0, making the implied inflation target negative.
stabilizing, although usually not significantly different from one. For the HP output gaps, while the inflation forecast coefficients are much larger than the inflation rate coefficients, they are never stabilizing. Some intuition for these results can be found in Figure 6 , which depicts inflation rates and one-to-four quarter inflation forecasts for 1966:1 -1979:2. The inflation forecasts are consistently lower than the inflation rates during 1969 -1972 and 1974 -1976 , periods that span the two recessions of the 1970s. With inflation forecasts lower than inflation rates, the inflation forecast coefficients need to be larger in order to produce the same changes in the federal funds rate.
Do these results provide evidence that the Federal Reserve followed a Taylor Reserve policy was too stimulative. The result that Federal Reserve policy followed the Taylor rule with regard to output gaps holds only with the CEA gaps, and is clearly a construct of the CEA gaps being too large. For the HP output gaps, the coefficients are clearly too large, consistent with the evidence presented above that the gaps are too small.
Stop-Start Monetary Policy
It is often postulated that the Federal Reserve followed a stop-start monetary policy in the 1970s, producing cycles of rising inflation, higher interest rates, and recession, followed by lower interest rates before inflation could be brought down to acceptable levels. 26 Levin and Taylor (2009) 
where  1 and  2 represent changes in the inflation target and D70 and D76 equal one starting in 1970:2 and 1976:1, zero otherwise. Combining terms as above and allowing for gradual adjustment of the interest rate, Equation (4) becomes,
where
Estimates of Equation (6) Table 3 . Since an inflation target cannot be identified unless the coefficient  in Equation (5) is greater than zero, we only report changes in the inflation target if the estimate of the inflation coefficient  is significantly different from one and at least one of the coefficients on the dummy variables  in Equation ( Meltzer (2009b) characterizes Federal Reserve policymaking in the 1970s as abandoning all concern about inflation whenever the unemployment rate rose to about 7 percent.
respectively, we only include the dummy variable for 1976:1 for these forecasts. The inflation forecast coefficients are significantly different from unity for all five output gap measures over all three forecast horizons. For the two-quarter inflation forecasts, the significant changes in the inflation target are 3.94 Our results do not support Levin and Taylor's conclusion that the Federal Reserve stabilized inflation around an increasing target. 28 When inflation rates are used, we do not find any specification for which the coefficient  on the inflation rate is significantly greater than unity, and so we cannot identify an inflation target, much less changes in the target. When inflation forecasts are used,  is significantly different from unity and the coefficients on the dummy variables starting in 1970:2 and 1976:1 are significantly different from zero for most specifications. However, as argued above, findings that the Federal Reserve raised the nominal interest rate more than point-for-point with inflation forecasts, but not with inflation rates, does not constitute evidence of inflation stabilization when the forecasts were systematically lower that the actual (or realized) rates during the crucial periods during or following recessions.
Conclusions
In writing that "My third concern about the new Fed balance sheet is that it has seriously handicapped the Fed's ability to fulfill its primary mission of promoting price stability." Taylor (2009b) writes "One way to determine when to exit is to use standard monetary policy rules. If such rules are to characterize policy 27 The output gap coefficients follow the pattern for specifications without changes in the inflation target. The coefficients on the HP gaps are the largest, followed by quadratic, linear, and CEA. 28 None of our specifications are exactly comparable to the one in Levin and Taylor (2009) . They use data from 1966:1 -1980:3, use revised CPI inflation rates instead of real-time GDP deflator inflation rates, use current-quarter real-time output gaps instead of one-quarter-lagged or within-quarter-forecasted gaps, and subtract the coefficients on the dummy variables from the inflation rates instead of the regression intercept.
after the exit from the current regime (as they did during the period of good economic performance in the 1980s and 1990s), then they can serve as a natural guideline for exiting. … One could use the Taylor rule for this purpose."
In the context of this paper, the key point is that It is commonly asserted that, because Federal Reserve policy is forward looking, it should be evaluated by using forecasts rather than actual values. This study illustrates the perils of such an assertion.
Concluding that monetary policy stabilized inflation in the 1970s because the Federal Reserve followed a
Taylor rule for forecasted, but not actual, inflation is akin to the conclusion that the operation was a success but the patient died. From today's perspective, the danger is that, once the recession turns into a recovery, inflation may start rising even as inflation forecasts remain low because of continued high unemployment. The lesson from the 1970s is that the Federal Reserve need to raise the federal funds rate more than point-for-point with inflation as the recovery begins, even if inflation forecasts lag actual inflation.
Our second lesson from the 1970s is that, if the Taylor rule is to be used as a guide to good monetary policy once the recovery begins, the coefficient on the output gap is potentially as important as the coefficient on inflation. Monetary policy in the 1970s was too stimulative, not just because the Taylor principle was not followed with respect to inflation, but also because interest rates were lowered too much in response to negative output gaps. From today's perspective, our findings that the Taylor rule was not followed during the Great Inflation with respect to either inflation or output gaps should be a cause for optimism, not for pessimism. The historical evidence presented here is consistent with a view that, if the Federal Reserve raises the federal funds rate more than point-for-point with inflation and does not respond too strongly to the output gap as the recovery begins, the 2010s can be a period of good economic performance like the 1980s and 1990s rather than a repeat of the 1970s. 
is the output gap, and i t is the interest rate. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. CEA t|t-1 denotes real-time CEA output gaps and CEA t|t denotes real-time CEA-forecast output gaps. for h={-1,1}.  t is inflation, y t is the output gap, and i t is the interest rate. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. CEA t|t-1 denotes real-time CEA output gaps and CEA t|t denotes real-time CEA-forecast output gaps. D1970Q2 and D1976Q1 are dummy variables that equal 1 starting 1970Q2 and 1976Q1, respectively, and 0 otherwise. for h={2,3,4}.  t is inflation, y t is the output gap, and i t is the interest rate. Newey-West robust standard errors are in parentheses. CEA t|t-1 denotes real-time CEA output gaps and CEA t|t denotes real-time CEA-forecast output gaps. D1970Q2 and D1976Q1 are dummy variables that equal 1 starting 1970Q2 and 1976Q1, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
